What, exactly, is wrong with Confucian filial morality?

Hagop SARKISSIAN, Emma Ellen Kathrina BUCHTEL

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlespeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Confucianism’s emphasis on filial piety is both a hallmark of its approach to ethics and a source of concern. Critics charge that filial piety’s extreme partialism corrupts Chinese society and should therefore be expunged from the tradition. Are the critics correct? In this article, we outline the criticism and note its persistence over the last century. We then evaluate data from the empirical study of corruption to see whether they support the claim that partialism corrupts. Finally, we report some recent experimental work done with colleagues testing the claim that filial piety is associated with tolerance of corruption in Chinese societies. The results suggest that the critics are on to something. However, partialism (or kin affection) is not a cause of concern. Instead, authoritarianism (another aspect of filial piety) is associated with tolerance of corruption. We conclude that critics should reformulate their criticisms if they seek to combat corruption effectively. Copyright © 2023 Hagop Sarkissian and Emma E. Buchtel.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)23-41
JournalRes Philosophica
Volume100
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2023

Citation

Sarkissian, H., & Buchtel, E. E. (2023). What, exactly, is wrong with Confucian filial morality? Res Philosophica, 100(1), 23-41. doi: 10.11612/resphil.2266

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'What, exactly, is wrong with Confucian filial morality?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.