The bonus scheme, motivation crowding-out and quality of the doctor-patient encounters in Chinese public hospitals

Jiwei QIAN, Jingwei Alex HE

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Methods of paying health providers have been extensively studied in health economics. Bonus as a powerful incentive has been widely used to boost staff morale and improve productivity in hospitals. This may, however, also create unintended consequences. This study analyzes primary data collected from a physician survey in China and demonstrates that the extensive use of quantity-based bonuses has not only led to the provision of unnecessary care but also crowded out physician’s intrinsic motivations, resulting in a decline in the quality of services. More appropriate physician remuneration mechanisms must be introduced in China’s ongoing health reform. Copyright © 2016 Springer Science+Business Media New York.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)143-158
JournalPublic Organization Review
Volume18
Issue number2
Early online dateOct 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018

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crowding out
physician
China
remuneration
health reform
intrinsic motivation
health
new media
productivity
incentive
staff
science
economics
Doctors
Public hospitals
Bonus
Physicians
Crowding out

Citation

Qian, J., & He, A. J. (2018). The bonus scheme, motivation crowding-out and quality of the doctor-patient encounters in Chinese public hospitals. Public Organization Review, 18(2), 143–158. doi: 10.1007/s11115-016-0366-y

Keywords

  • Public hospital
  • China
  • Provider payment
  • Doctor-patient relationship
  • Motivation
  • Bonus