Buy high, sell low: How listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions

Yan Leung Stephen CHEUNG, Yuehua QI, P. Raghavendra RAU, Aris STOURAITIS

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

46 Citations (Scopus)


We examine a sample of 254 related party and arms’ length acquisitions and sales of assets in Hong Kong during 1998–2000. Our analysis shows that publicly listed firms enter deals with related parties at unfavourable prices compared to similar arms’ length deals. Firms acquire assets from related parties by paying a higher price compared to similar arms’ length deals. In contrast, when they sell assets to related parties, they receive a lower price than in similar arms’ length deals. With the exception of audit committees, corporate governance characteristics have limited impact on transaction prices. Firms with audit committees on their boards pay lower prices to related parties for acquisitions and receive higher prices from related parties from divestments. Copyright © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)914-924
JournalJournal of Banking and Finance
Issue number5
Publication statusPublished - May 2009


Asset prices
Related party transactions
Audit committee
Hong Kong
Corporate governance
Transaction price
Low pay


Cheung, Y.-L., Qi, Y., Rau, P. R., & Stouraitis, A. (2009). Buy high, sell low: How listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions. Journal of Banking and Finance, 33(5), 914-924. doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.10.002


  • International corporate governance
  • Expropriation
  • Related party transactions
  • Tunneling