Religious belief is a topic of longstanding interest to psychological science, but the psychology of religious disbelief is a relative newcomer. One prominently discussed model is analytic atheism, wherein cognitive reflection, as measured with the Cognitive Reflection Test, overrides religious intuitions and instruction. Consistent with this model, performance-based measures of cognitive reflection predict religious disbelief in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, & Democratic) samples. However, the generality of analytic atheism remains unknown. Drawing on a large global sample (N = 3461) from 13 religiously, demographically, and culturally diverse societies, we find that analytic atheism as usually assessed is in fact quite fickle cross-culturally, appearing robustly only in aggregate analyses and in three individual countries. The results provide additional evidence for culture's effects on core beliefs. Copyright © 2018. The authors license this article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
|Journal||Judgment and Decision Making|
|Publication status||Published - May 2018|
Gervais, W. M., Van Elk, M., Xygalatas, D., McKay, R. T., Aveyard, M., Buchtel, E. E., . . . Bulbulia, J. (2018). Analytic atheism: A cross-culturally weak and fickle phenomenon? Judgment and Decision Making, 13(3), 268-274. Retrieved from http://journal.sjdm.org/vol13.3.html
- Cultural learning
- Dual process cognition
- Religious cognition
- WEIRD people