A nice electricity market design

Chi Keung WOO, Jay ZARNIKAU

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper proposes a nice electricity market design that is efficient and practical, meaningfully satisfying the wants of a market design's stakeholders. Hence, this new design should be considered by countries that have reformed their electricity sectors or are in the process of doing so. Copyright © 2019 Published by Elsevier Inc.
Original languageEnglish
Article number106638
JournalThe Electricity Journal
Volume32
Issue number9
Early online dateJul 2019
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - Jul 2019

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Electricity
Power markets

Bibliographical note

Woo, C. K., & Zarnikau, J. (2019). A nice electricity market design. The Electricity Journal, 32(9). Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2019.106638

Keywords

  • Electricity market design
  • Missing money
  • Price manipulation
  • Reliability differentiation
  • Renewable energy
  • Tolling agreements