關於以薪養廉有效性的探討:基於中國的經驗

公婷, 吳木鑾

Research output: Contribution to journalArticles

Abstract

腐敗的原因和治理對策是學界和實踐部門共同關注的議題。許多人認為,公務員報酬過低是腐敗產生的重要原因之一。在新加坡和香港地區高薪養廉的啟發下,許多國家包括中國在不同程度上嘗試通過以薪養廉來提升政府治理的質量。公務員收入過低無法保證正常的家庭生活開支。過低的薪酬有可能損害公務員保持個人誠信的努力,引致腐敗行為。公務員薪酬的提高,甚至高於社會的平均工資水準,在此背景下“以薪”是否可以“養廉”?這是重要的理論和實踐問題。基於實證數據,文章認為,公務員薪酬和廉政建設有著復雜的關系,對它們的相關性存在著一些認識上的誤區。過去十餘年間,我國公務員薪酬水準上升較快,腐敗的程度也有所加深。
The cause of corruption and the strategy for combating corruption are important topics of interest to academics and practitioners. Many people view low salaries of civil servants as a contributing factor to corruption. Many countries including China, inspired by the experiences of corruption control of Singapore and Hong Kong, are promoting good civil service remuneration to ensure government integrity. Extremely low civil service remuneration makes it difficult for public workers to keep their heads above water. Low civil service pay may also discourage civil servants’ effort to maintain personal integrity and result in so-called need-based corruption. However, if civil service pay is substantially increased to a level above the average salary in society, would it help reduce corruption? This is an important theoretical and practical question. Drawing on longitudinal data from China, this article suggests that the relationship between civil service remuneration and corruption control is complex and there are misunderstandings concerning their correlation. The findings indicate that the civil service pay and corruption level have increased in parallel over the past 15 years. Some policy implications are drawn from this study. Copyright © 2012 中共中央編譯局當代馬克思主義研究所.
Original languageChinese
Pages (from-to)117-129
Journal經濟社會體制比較
Volume2012
Issue number5
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2012

Citation

公婷和吳木鑾(2012):關於以薪養廉有效性的探討:基於中國的經驗,《經濟社會體制比較》,2012(5),頁117-129。

Keywords

  • 公務員工資
  • 廉政建設
  • 以薪養廉
  • 公共治理
  • Civil service pay
  • Corruption
  • High pay to deter corruption
  • Public governance
  • Alt. title: The effect of pay raises on corruption prevention: Evidence from the Chinese public sector