市場化改革、企業業績與國有企業經理薪酬

本文結合國有企業市場化改革的制度背景，就市場化改革對國有企業經理薪酬契約的影響進行了理論分析和實證檢驗。研究發現，市場化進程增強了國有企業經理薪酬之於企業業績的敏感性，同時，相對於會計業績而言，市場業績在薪酬契約中的作用有逐漸增加的跡象。進一步研究表明，行業保護和政府控制級別影響了市場力量塑造國有企業經理薪酬契約的能力。研究還發現，市場化改革可能降低了國有企業的在職消費水準。本文為市場力量推動國有企業治理結構的動態變遷這一假說提供了經驗證據。
Based on the institutional settings of recent market-oriented reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this paper analyses the impact of market force on the choice of executive compensation in SOEs. Using the data on stated-owned listed firms, we find that market-oriented reform increases the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance. Compared to the accounting performance, our evidence shows that stock returns play an increasing important role in executive incentive contracts. Our findings also show that government protection and government control level of SOEs influence the ability of market forces to shape the incentive contracts in SOEs. Moreover, SOEs located in the provinces with high degree of regional marketization have fewer perks. These results suggest that market force induces the adaptation of governance structure. Copyright © 2009 中國社會科學院經濟研究所.