地方政府部門的過度職務消費：組織同構理論的視角

從20世紀80年代以來，中國政府就開始關注職務消費當中的奢侈浪費現象，並一直努力嘗試約束政府部門的過度職務消費。但是直到2012年，過度職務消費一直沒有得到根本的改善。職務消費似乎只是一件小事，但是如果政府連職務消費都無法有效治理，那麼其治理能力就會受到質疑與挑戰。為什麼過度職務消費的治理這麼難？本文從組織同構理論出發，探討過度職務消費深層次的制度原因。通過分析地方政府過度職務消費的案例，本文討論同構壓力的來源，同構壓力如何影響官員的行為，以及同構壓力如何得以持續。基於與65個政府官員的深度訪談以及相關政府檔和媒體報導，本文認為在中國科層組織內的同構壓力可能已經被制度化了，並導致違背法律法規的非正式制度盛行。本文最後簡要分析十八大以來反腐敗實踐對政府官員職務消費行為的影響。
The Chinese government has paid attention to official extravagance in the position-related consumption since the 1980s and made intensive endeavor to discipline and penalize such behavior. Nevertheless, the effort had hardly been effective until 2012. It will become a big challenge to the governance capacity if the government is unable to curb and prevent official extravagance. Why is it so difficult to overcome excessive position-related consumption? Based on organizational isomorphism, this study investigates the institutional forces contributing to official extravagance. Particularly, it discusses the sources of isomorphic pressures, the impact of isomorphic pressures on the behavior of government officials, and the sustaining mechanisms of the pressures. Based on the evidence from 65 interviews with government officials, relevant official decrees and media reports about position-related consumption, this study finds that isomorphic pressures upon position-related consumption have been institutionalized in the Chinese bureaucratic context, leading to the prevailing practice of extravagance which significantly deviates from the formal rules and regulations. Finally, this study briefly explores the impact of the anti-corruption reform after 2012 on position-related consumption. Copyright © 2017 復旦大學國際關係與公共事務學院.